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Cert to CAl 
(Coffin, Bownes, & Wyzanski 
[by design.]) 
Federal/Habeas Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr argues that CAl erred in suppressing 
resp's three confessions, eact/nade after proper Miranda warnings, 
solely because an attorney unrequested by the defendant was given 






ther interrogation that night, and the defendant was not informed 
of his attorney's attempt to see him. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: On June 29, 1977, petr 
was arrested in Cranston, R.I., along with two others, Sparks and 
DiOrio, and charged with breaking and entering. During interro-
gation, police learned that petr and DiOrio ' lived at 306 New York 
Avenue. Detective Ferranti recognized the address as the one 
given by a confidential informant. According to the informant, a -----------.___ 
man named "Butch" who lived at 306 New York Avenue was responsi-
ble for the unsolved murder of one Mary Jo Hickey. The detective 
learned from DiOrio that resp was the only "Butch" residing at 
the address, a fact that resp later confirmed. Ferranti informed 
resp of his Miranda rights, and resp refused to waive them. I Shortly thereafter, Ferranti obtained statements from Sparks and 
DiOrio implicating resp in the murder of Mary Jo Hickey. Since 
the murder had occurred in Providence, the Cranston police in-
formed the Providence police of what they had learned. About an 
hour later, at 7 p.m., three Providence detectives arrived and 
spoke to Detective Ferranti and then Sparks and D'Orio. 
At about 7:45, resp's sister called the Public Defender 
to seek assistance for him. She asked for an assistant public 
defender named Richard Casparian who was representing resp on 
unrelated charged. Because Casparian was unavailable, another 
assistant, Allegra Munson, was contacted and informed of resp's 
arrest. Ms. Munson then called the Cr~nston police station, 
asked if resp was being held, and explained that she would act as 
resp's counsel in the event that resp would be subjected to a 
- -
lineup or interrogation. The unidentified person who answered 
the phone told Ms. Munson that resp would not be questioned or 
put in a lineup, that they were "through with him for the night." 
Ms. Munson was not informed that the Providence police were at 
the station or that resp was a suspect in the Hickey murder. 
Petr was never informed of Ms. Munson's offer of assistance. 
At approximately 9 p.m., resp was brought brought 
Ferranti and the three Providence detectives. He was again ad-
vised of his rights and was questioned about the murder. Petr 
denied involvement and was returned to the holding cell. About 
10 minutes later, Ferranti heaid resp banging on his cell door. 
He went to see what the ' problem was, and found resp crying, say-
make a The detectives again 
read resp his Miranda rights and resp signed a waiver of rights 
form. For the next 50 minutes, resp answered the detectives' 
questions about the murder and then signed a confession. Some-
time later, he called for the detectives and said he had omitted 
some information. He again was given his Miranda warnings and 
gave another statement. The next day resp was taken to Provi-
dence police headquart~rs and gave a third inculpatory statement. 
After this last statement, the police called the Public 
Defender's office to have an attorney assist resp at the lineup. 
The TC denied resp's motion to suppress his three writ-
--------
ten statements. It found that there was no collusion or conspir-
acy on the part of the police to keep resp from talking to Ms. 
Munson. It also found that resp's statements were entirely vol-
untary and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right 
- -
to counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination. Petr 
was convicted of first-degree murder. The R.I. Supreme Court 
affirmed the conviction by a 3-2 vote. The DC subsequently de-
nied resp'y/habeas petition. On appeal, CAl reversed. 
✓cAl held that use of resp's statements violated his 5th 
Amendment right to counsel and privilege against self-
incrimination. In reaching this conclusion, the court evaluated 
the totality of circumstances. It focused on the voluntariness 
of resp's waiver of counsel in light of 3 factors: the failure to 
inform resp that (1) Munson had called; (2) Munson had been in-
formed that there would be no questioning or lineup that night; 
(3) the conduct of the police in not informing resp of these 
things. CAl reasoned that resp's reaction to an concrete offer 
of assistance such as Munson's may well have been different from 
his reaction to the abstract "right to have counsel present." 
Moreover, the court determined that the failure to inform resp of 
Munson's offer in fact frustrated the opportunity to consult with 
counsel. In these circumstances, "there is no room for specula-
tion what defendant might or might not have chosen to do after he 
had that opportunity." The court also concluded that there was 
no explanation for the failure to inform resp of Munson's call 
other than "deliberate or reckless irresponsibility." It agreed 
with the DC, however, that there was no evidence of collusion or 
conspiracy on the part of the police to withhold information from 
resp. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that CAl's decision is in 
direct conflict with CAll.'s decision in Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 
-
- -
940 (CAl 1983) and with the decision of the Sup. Court of R.I. 
The case presents the substantial question of the effect, on the 
voluntariness of a defendant's waiver of rights, of the failure 
to ·inform a defendant of an unrequested attorney's attempt to 
assist him. Petr also argues that there is no factual support in 
the record for CAl's - determination that the failure to inform 
petr of Munson's call was reckless. 
Resp argues that CAl properly applied the totality of 
circumstances test in determining that resp did not voluntarily 
waive his right to an attorney. It considered the fact that resp 
was 21 years old and had only a 5th grade education, that he had 
been held incommunicado for 6 hours, and twice had invoked his 
right to remain silent. 
Moreover, resp argues, there is no conflict between 
-= 
CAl and CAll. In Hance, the defendan was being held by military 
authorities and his attorney tried to reach him at the county 
jail and police headquarters. They knew nothing of the defend-
ant's situation and correctly so informed the attorney. By the 
time the lawyer reached military authorites, the defendant had 
already confessed. He was informed of the lawyer's attempt to 
see him, and refused to speak with him. Thus, in Hance the at-
torney was not misled about the defendant's whereabouts or situa-
tion. In addition, the factual situation presented by this case 
occurs infrequently. In the 7 cases since Miranda in which the 
situation has occurred, the courts have unanimously held as CAl 
did here : 
- -
Finally, CAl did not err in finding the conduct of 
the police "reckless." In so doing, the court gave full credence 
to the factual findings of the TC that there was no conspiracy, 
but merely supplemented the findings on the basis of the record, 
in accordance with Sumner v. Mata. 
4. DISCUSSION: It's a bit hard to follow CAl's rea-
soning on why resp's confessions weren't voluntary. As in Oregon ----v. Elstad, his confession does not seem to be involuntary simply 
because had he known something additional, he may not have con-
fessed. The resp is correct that there is no conflict between 
this case and Hance. Resp is also correct that a number of other 
state courts have reached the same conclusion on similar facts as 
CAl did here. The facts presented are fairly unusual, and thus I 
think the case is probably too factbound to warrant this Court's 
attention. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
April 29, 1985 Levins Opin in petn 
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September 10, 1985 
MORAN GINA-POW 
84-1485 Moran v. Burbine (CAl) 
MEMO TO FILE 
This case was generally familiar before I read the 
briefs over Labor Day weekend. Check the files to see if 
I read another set of briefs and dictated a memo sometime 
ago. Even if I did, I may have read the briefs - and 
particularly the opinions below - more carefully this 
time. 
The Question Presented is as follows: 
"Does the self-incrimination clause oft~ 
Fifth Amendment require the suppression of three 
confessions, each made after proper Miranda 
warnings and three valid waivers of rights, 
solely because an attorney, unrequested by the 
defendant, was given misleading information by a 
p:>lice officer that there would be no further 
interrogation of the defendant that night and 
the defendant was not informed of the attorney's 
telephone call?" 
'Ihis question was presented in a federal habeas 
corpus petition filed in the Rhode Island District Court 
after respondent's conviction of murder in the state court 
had been approved ( 3-2) by the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island. The DC reviewed the record of the state 









finding a violation of 
respondent's Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate 
himself. 
If we decide this case on the basis of weighing all 
of the pertinent facts and circumstances, the type of 
analysis adopted by the DC and CAl, our decision would be 
of limi tea precedental value. 
light is quite fact - specific. 
The case, viewed in this 
The facts are stated by 
both the DC and CAl, and I will not do more than highlight 
what seem to me to be the more essential ones • 
Respondent was taken into custody in Cranston, Rhode 
Island on a ubreaking and enteringtt charge. On the basis 
of information irrelevant to the Cranston 
p:>lice had reason to suspect respondent may have been 
guilty of a murder committed in Providence a few months 
earlier. Providence police were called, and three of its 
officers - two dectectives and a police captain - arrived 
at the Cranston Police Headquarters at about 7 P.M. on 
June 29, 1977. At about 7:45 P.M. respondent's sister 
called the Off ice of the Public Defender, and asked for ---. 
Assistant Public Defender Casparian, and stated that her 
brother had missed an appointment with Casparian that 
afternoon to discuss the breaking and entering charge. 
• 
• 
- - 3. 
When Casparian could not be located, another Assistant 
Fublic Defender (Munson) was informed of the situation, 
and Ms. Munson called the Cranston Police Station, 
explained to the person who answered the phone in the 
detective's 
Casparian. 
off ice that her brother was represented by 
(~~) 
She further stated that she would act as 
i1 
respondent's counsel in the event police intended to 
question him. The person to whom she talked - who was 
never identified is alleged to have told her that 
respondent would not be questioned or put into a lineup as 
they were through with him for the night. Ms. Munson was 
not informed that the Providence Police were at the 
Cranston Police Station or that her brother was a suspect 
in the murder case. 
&lbsequent to Munson's call, respondent was advised 
of his Miranda rights. Initially he said nothing, but 
about 10 minutes later he advised the police that he 
YBnted to make a statement. In brief summary, Miranda 
rights were repeated - I believe more than once - and that 
night respondent signed a waiver of rights form, and gave --
a typed, four-page statement confessing to the murder. He -signed the statement and it was notarized by one of the 
detective. Respondent, on his own initiative, later that 
• 
- - 4. 
evening advised the police that he had omitted some 
information, and after Miranda rights were again given 
respondent added to his confession. Finally, at noon th: 








'lhe TC made a number of findings, including the 
following: Ms. Munson did make the phone call, but "there 
was no collusion or conspiracy on the part of the police 
'to secrete respondent from his attorney •.. '"· It also is 
conceded that 
respondent and 
none of the police who interrogated 
received his several confessions had any 
knowledge of Munson's call until long after interrogations 
had been completed. Nor did respondent know about 
M..mson 's call, as apparently the unidentified person who 
received her call failed to inform anyone. It is 
ooteworthy, however, that respondent at the time was 
represented by Public defender Casparian in connection 
~ with another er iminal case. I ~ ed, he had a scheduled 
~.t,/"'~poi~ tment with Ca ~ an on the day he was apprehended 
A,,- ~ ~ +-" by the Cranston Police. A fact of considerable 
•~ importance - at least to me - is that respond~ t ma~ no 
~ request to seek Casparian or to have a lawyer at any time • ~/.~ ----~ ~)?-~ ' 
~r h, 1),11--





after he had been taken into custody on the murder charge. 
~ certainly had multiple opportunities to ask for 
Casparian, or t - as the Miranda warning -=---
advised him - to remian silent until he had a lawyer. ----Also, a telphone was available to him at all times. 
Finally, - and I should have noted this above - the OC 
found that respondent was advised of his constitutional 
rights "in a thorough, indeed meticulous manner; that he 
ceknowledged his comprehension of these rights; that he 
specifically agreed to speak with the officers without the 
presence of counsel"; (and that there was "no suggestion 
of police brutality or of coercion, psychological duress, 
elicit inducement, intimidation, or the like." Nor was 
respondent grilled for long stretches of time or in 
~ 
unusually oppressive circumstances. Accordingly, the ~ 
agreed with the finding of the state trial court that 
/)? ¥ respondent had waived his right to counsel and right to ~> remai~ s1len ';. "knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily". 
Y.:: ~ ,-,,..1~ In a word, there had been no violation of respondent• s % ·. ,,,..f-' Fifth Amendment rights . None of the courts be low reached 
~0e Sixth Amendment question . r; lAf1"" Ra lying on Nor th Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. at 374, 
375, the Court of Appeals stated that it must consider and 
• 
- - 6 • 
• 
• 
weigh the "particular facts and circumstances". The Court 
of Appeals rejected the New York Mandatory requirement 
that the waiver of the right to self-incrimination and of 
counsel must be made in the presence of a neutral officer. 
It concluded, however, that under the circumstances in 
this case respondent's waiver of the right to counsel was 
not made knowingly. Where counsel, at the request of his 
sister, had advised the police that she represented 
respondent, there should have been no further 
interrogation even where the officers who undertook it had 
no knowledge of the lawyer's telephone call. The Court of 
Pppeals found that there was unexplained and inexcusable 
neglect - if not deliberate - concealment of the telephone 
~
call by Munson. So far as I recall, none of the other 
~r courts suggested any concealment or deliberate misconduct. 
t),f-~ ~ ~ t, there was negligence. 
~ 'Ihe Court of Appeals in its identification of 
• 
relevant facts and circumstances, mentioned that 
respondent was only twenty-one years of age, did not have 
a long criminal record, and had only a fifth grade 
education. 








- - 7. 
If the question whether there has been a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel requires - as 
the courts below believed - a consideration of all of the 
relevant facts and circumstances, I'm inclined - at least 
ten ta ti vely - to agree with the DC and the state trial 
---------------------- .... "'-' court. The single most pertinent fact for me is that --respondent knew he had a lawyer, indeed had scheduled an 
appointment with him on the very day he was identified as 
a murder suspect, had a telephone available, and yet on 
three separate occasions confessed to the murder after ~ 
J,,.~ Miranda warnings had been given and repeated - even on the 
,p- ~Jollowing day. Respondent did not know Munson. Even if 
9-~ he had been advised of Munson's call, it seems extremely 
~~ 
~ 
unlikely that he would have accepted her as his counsel, 
or decline to be interrogated, because he already had a 
lawyer whom he must have made a conscious decision not to 
call. 
Although the parties do not debate the issue, it 
seems to me that the Cour v f Appeals gave scant weight to .. 
the findings of fact by the state TC - contrary to the 
provisions of §2254. See Summner v. Mata . 




- - 8 • 
The SG's brief would go beyond weighing the relevant 
facts and circumstances. He argues flatly that police are 
not required to inform respondent of an attorney's 
unsolicited offer of legal representation as a predicate 
to obtaining a voluntary and knowing waiver of Miranda 
rights. As his ir~ states, neither the Sixth Amendment 
ror respondent's right ~ocess obligated the police 
to inform respondent of this attorney's telephone call. I 
am not sure I could along with the SG without substantial 
qualifications. It is not clear to me that the SG's 
p:>sition is limited to the call by an attorney who 
volunteers to represent a person in custody. This would 
be and important limitation on the SG's position, although 
in this case where respondent's sister requested 
representation by the Public Defender's Office, the 
situation could be different. I will be quite interested 
in my clerk's views in a brief bobtail memo. 
LFP, JR • 
- - M 
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 ~.4"c.,, -t.-t< 
November 6, 1985 -
~~. 
Bill 
Moran v. Burbine, No. 84-1485 
Cert to CAl 
~ C° A I ~ ~ 
~ #-le. c:.A-2.-L dA..J 
~ i.f-~~ 
~~--Argument date: November 13, 1985 
1. 
~~~A.- It,~~ ~A__,,~/ ;-z__ 
Questions Presented ~ ~ ~~ 
~~~--
Does the Fifth Amendment (or Miran8 a v. Arizona) 
require the suppression of ~ ncededly voluntary confessirn 
tecause the suspect was not told that a relative had retained a 
lawyer for him? 
2. If not, does the Sixth Amendment impose such a 
requirement, even though the statement was given before the 
- - 2. 
initiation of adversary proceedings under Gouveia v. United 
aates? 
Statement of Facts 
'fuur memo to the file in this case contains a good 
discussion of the facts; I'll quickly summarize the most 
important ones. I should state at the outset that my own 
analysis of this case does not turn on its particular facts. I -----------recognize, however, that yours may, as CAl's certainly did. 
On March 3, 1977, Mary Jo Hickey was bludgeoned to death 
in Providence, Rhode Island. The next day, respondent Burbine 
was arrested in Cranston, Rhode Island for breaking and entering. 
Che of the Cranston detectives noticed that respondent's address 
matched the address at which an informant said Hickey's murderer 
resided. The detective called police in Providence (at 7:00 
p.m.), who came to the Cranston headquarters to interrogate 
respondent. At this point, the Cranston police had already 
obtained statements implicating respondent in the murder from tw 
other prisoners. 
Af:. 7:45 p.m., respondent's sister acting without 
respondent's knowledge -- called the public defender's office and 
c:Sked to speak to a lawyer who was representing respondent on an 
unrelated charge. That lawyer was not available. Another lawyer 
in thepuEITc defender's office -- Allegra Munson -- then phoned 
the Cranston police station. Munson asked whether respondent was 
b:ing held there, and was told that he was. Munson then stated 
that she would serve as respondent's counsel in the event that 
- - 3. 
the police wished to question him or put him in a lineup. The 
EX)lice detective who took the call told Munson they were through 
with respondent for the night. Police did subsequently question 
res~ and respondent made t~ e incriminating statements. 
~ is undisputed that respondent received Miranda warnings (more 
than once) prior to being questioned, and that the statements 
W:re voluntary. It is also undisputed that respondent never 
asked for a lawyer. 
In denying respondent's motion to suppress the statements, 
the Rhode Island TC found that (1) the phone call described above 
did take place, but (2) there was no conspiracy to keep 
respondent away from his attorney. App to Petn For Cert 114. 
':lhe TC ruled that the confessions were voluntary, and that only 
~ / 
respondent could assert his own right to counsel. The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) that respondent's 
confessions were voluntary, (2) that under federal law the police 
~re not required to tell respondent that a lawyer had offered to 
represent him, and (3) that under Rhode Island law, "no 
relationship of attorney and client ~ sted between Ms. Munson 
~d [respondent]." Id., at 63. The DC denied federal habeas on 
nuch the same ground: ~ l reversed, apparently on the ground 
that respondent's waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights was not 
''voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" because he was tricked by 
police. 
Discussion 
- - 4. 
I'll first discuss the status of CAl's finding of 
trickery, and then address the Fifth and Sixth Amendment issues. 
I. Was There Deception? 
CAl found that the conduct of the policeman who answered 
Munson's phone call (and who remains unidentified) was "at least 
inexcusably 
Throughout 
reckless." E.g. , 









:EOliceman's statements to Munson, followed by the failure to tell 
respondent about Munson's call, in effect tricked respondent into 
confessing when he might not have. 
.h your memo to the file, you ask whether this finding 
accords sufficient deference to the state TC' s finding of m 
conspiracy to keep respondent from his client. I think it does. 
CAl did not find that the policemen who questioned respondent 
knew about the phone call. Nor did it find that the telephone 
conversation was part of a concerted plan to isolate respondent 
until he confessed. Rather, CAl accepted the state TC's finding 
that the phone call took place, and determined that that - ~ -
recessarily meant that someone at the police station had been 
inexcusably reckless in failing either to inform Munson about the 
impending questioning of respondent or to inform the 
interrogators about the conversation with Munson. I do not 
l:elieve this conflicts with the state TC' s factual findings, o, 
- - 5. 
with the Rhode Island S.Ct's recitation of the facts. 1 Both 
state courts emphasized that there was no conspiracy to keep 
respondent from his counsel, but both also found that Munson's -
account of the phone conversation was correct. 
ll. Did Respondent Waive His Fifth Amendment Rights? 
--? I 
1 There !..§_ one possible conflict. The Rhode Island 
fupreme Court found that the evidence "could give rise to 
a reasonable inference" that the policeman who answered 
M.lnson's phone call was talking about the Cranston robbery 
charge and not the Providence murder charge when he said 
the police would not be questioning respondent any more 
that night. App to Petn for Cert 64 n. 5. CAl found that 
ruch an inference was "unsupported by the record," because 
the two police departments were "working hand in hand," 
md plainly the people in the station house knew about 
m:>th investigations. Id., at 17. 
'lhe Rhode IslandSupreme Court's statement, read in 
context, was not itself a factual finding, but rather was 
a basis for affirming the TC's finding that there was no 
conspiracy to keep respondent separated from a lawyer. 
CAl does not dispute the finding of no conspiracy. 
Rather, CAl simply concludes that the person who answered 
the phone was at least reckless in failing to tell someone 
about Munson's call. Thus, I don't think this apparent 
disagreement really raises a §2254(d) issue. 
Even if it did, the conflict would matter only tt 
fue difference between negligence and recklessness is 
critical to this case. I don't think it is. The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court found that there was no attorney-
client relationship between Munson and respondent. App to 
Eetn for Cert 63. Moreover, CAl's finding was that the 
unidentified person who answered Munson's call was 
reckless, not that the nondisclosure was intentional. 
'llus, this case presents, at most, a reckless failure to 
tell a suspect that a lawyer whom the suspect didn't kna-1 
rad volunteered to represent him. Given the Court's 
&cision in Oregon v. Elstad, 105 s.ct. 1285 (1985), I 
think it would be difficult to see how a lice 
mistake -- even a rec e o e -- ect the 




- 6. •1-~~ 
That directly leads to the Fifth Amendment ~ 
~ 
IBsue, I find myself in substantial agreement with the Solicitor 
General's brief. Respondent cannot possibly argue that his 
confession was involuntary under the Fifth Amendment; both the 
state TC and the DC found otherwise and CAl did not disagree. 
'lhus, the only possible Fifth Amendment argument is that 
respondent's confessions were taken in violation of Miranda v. 











informing suspects of their constitutional right to remain silent 
and to obtain legal counsel should, in all but the very rare 
case, dissipate the worst of the coercive atmosphere of the 
s:ation house. Where Miranda warnings are not given, any 
mculpatory statements are inadmissible in the government's case 
in chief, even if the statements are voluntary. This serves as 
a1 incentive to police to give the warnings, while the warnings 
in turn serve to ensure that suspects' confessions are voluntary. 
Miranda thus sweeps somewhat more broadly than the Fifth 
Amendment, Oregon v. Elstad, 105 s.ct. 1285, 1292 (1985), but 
that should not obscure the fact that Miranda i s designed to 
ensure the voluntariness of the confessions that police obtain 
through custodial interrogation. 
It isn't clear how a rule that police must notify a 
suspect when a lawyer has volunteered 
necessary to ensure that a confession is 
to represent him is 
voluntary. Respondent 
in this case had every opportunity to request counsel or to 
-
remain silent; he chose to do 
simply that had he known that a 1 
represent him, he might have behave 
other words, his confession was no 
interest. 
The problem with the argument 
not be in the suspect~ s -------- --
a:]missible. Last term, in 







had volunteered to 
differently that, in 
in his informed self-
that a confession need -
in order to t:.e 
105 s.ct. 1285 
after 
Miranda warnings was admissible, notwithstanding that the suspect 
had already confessed without receiving Miranda warnings. The 
Cburt also held that police were not required to tell the suspect 
that the first confession was inadmissible, concluding simply 
~at "This Court has never embraced the theory that a defendant's 
ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates 
~eir voluntariness." Id., at 1297. 
It seems to me very plausible to assume that, 
been told that his first confession could not be used against him 
t:.ecause it was taken in violation of Miranda, he might not have 
confessed again. The fact that the Court nevertheless found his 
Second confession voluntary shows that neither the Fifth 
Anendment nor Miranda requires police to give suspects 
information that may be highly relevant to the suspect's tactical 
&cision whether to talk. All that is 
that the suspect know his own rights. 
his rights in this case. -llnendment/Miranda issue. I think 
required under Elstad is 
R~ pond; nt was informed--:f ; 
that resolves the Fifth 
- - 8. 
'!his answer is thorougly consistent with North Carolina v. 
Bltler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), on which CAl relied for the 
proposition that a Miranda waiver was to be judged in light of 
al the circumstances. In Butler, the issue was whether Miranda 
rights could be waived by conduct rather than by words; the Court 
h2ld that the rights could be waived by implication. It was in 
fuat connection that the Court stated that "the question of 
waiver must be determined 'on the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the background t. 
EKperience, and conduct of the accused."' 441 u.s., at 374-375 
(emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 
(1938)). Note that the "circumstances" the Court mentioned -
fue accused's background, experience, and conduct are all 
directly relevant to the question whether the accused understocd 
the rights which he was purportedly waiving. The information in 
this case 
respondent 
the fact that Munson had volunteered to represent 
does not seem to me to be in the same category. 
III. Was the Confession taken in violation of respondent's Sixth 
Amendment rights? 
In ~ ouveia v. United States, 104 s.ct. 2292 (1984), the 
Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not apply prior to the 
initiation of formal proceedings against the defendant, whether 
~ information, indictment, or arraignment. Re§ponden t ha.g not 
bee charged with the Hickey murder at the 
C to p~lice. Gouveia therefore controls question. 
!(~~~~~, 
time of his statements 
the Sixth Amendment 
- - 9. 
I should note that Gouveia would not foreclose a holding 
that the police may not interfere with an existing attorney-
client relationship. Here, however, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Cburt found I}£_ attorney-client relationship existed between 
M.lnson and respondent. App to Petn for Cert 63. CAl appears to 
disagree with this holding, i_g. at 10 n. 3, but that doesn't 
natter. The existence or non-existence of an attorney-client 
relationship is either a question of fact, as to which there is a 
~esumption of correctness, or a question of state law which the 
federal courts cannot reconsider. Thus, the Court need not hold 
in this case that police may keep a suspect's lawyer from seeing 
the suspect during pre-arraignment interrogation. Rather, all 
the Court need hold is that police may keep a lawyer /volunteer 
from a suspect the lawyer wishes to represent during such 
interrogation, in circumstances where the suspect has never 
"I. 
requested to see a lawyer. 
IV. Conclusions 
I recommend reversal. The reckless failure to notify 
respondent that a lawyer had called offering to represent him did 
rot undermine the voluntariness of his confession. See Oregon v. 
&stad, supra. Further, under Gouveia v. United States, supra, 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not apply to the 
interrogation in this case. Consequently, the failure to 
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From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: ___ ·_ 2 _____ _ 
Recirculated: _________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1485 
JOHN MORAN, SUPERINTENDENT, RHODE ISLAND 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PETITIONER 
v. BRIAN K. BURBINE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1986] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
After being informed of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and after executing a series of 
written waivers, respondent confessed to the murder of a 
young woman. At no point during the course of the interro-
gation, which occurred prior to arraignment, did he request 
an attorney. While he was in police custody, his sister at-
tempted to retain a lawyer to represent him. The attorney 
telephoned the police station and received assurances that re-
spondent would not be questioned further until the next day. 
In fact, the interrogation session that yielded the inculpatory 
statements began later that evening. The question pre-
sented is whether either the conduct of the police or respond-
ent's ignorance of the attorney's efforts to reach him taints 
the validity of the waivers and therefore requires exclusion of 
the confessions. 
I 
On the morning of March 3, 1977, Mary Jo Hickey was 
found unconscious in a factory parking lot in Providence, 
Rhode Island. Suffering from injuries to her skull appar-
ently inflicted by a metal pipe found at the scene, she was 
rushed to a nearby hospital. Three weeks later she died 
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Several months after her death, the Cranston, Rhode Is-
land police arrested respondent and two others in connection 
with a local burglary. Shortly before the arrest, Detective 
Ferranti of the Cranston police force had learned from a con-
fidential informant that the man responsible for Ms. Hickey's 
death lived at a certain address and went by the name of 
"Butch." Upon discovering that respondent lived at that ad-
dress and was known by that name, Detective Ferranti in-
formed respondent of his Miranda rights. When respondent 
refused to execute a written waiver, Detective Ferranti 
spoke separately with the two other suspects arrested on the 
breaking and entering charge and obtained statements fur-
ther implicating respondent in Ms. Hickey's murder. At ap-
proximately 6:00 p. m., Detective Ferranti telephoned the 
police in Providence to convey the information he had uncov-
ered. An hour later, three officers from that department ar-
rived at the Cranston headquarters for the purpose of ques-
tioning respondent about the murder. 
That same evening, at about 7:45 p. m. , respondent's sister 
telephoned the Office of the Public Defender to obtain legal 
assistance for her brother. Her sole concern was the break-
ing and entering charge, as she was unaware that respondent 
was then under suspicion for murder. She asked for Richard 
Casparian who had been scheduled to meet with respondent 
earlier that afternoon to discuss another charge unrelated to 
either the break-in or the murder. As soon as the conversa-
tion ended, the attorney who took the call attempted to reach 
Mr. Casparian. When those efforts were unsuccessful, she 
telephoned Allegra Munson, another Assistant Public De-
fender, and told her about respondent's arrest and his sister's 
subsequent request that the office represent him. 
At 8:15 p. m., Ms. Munson telephoned the Cranston police 
station and asked that her call be transferred to the detective 
division. In the words of the Supreme Court of Rhode Is-
land, whose factual findings we treat as presumptively cor-
-
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rect, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), the conversation proceeded as 
follows: 
"A male voice responded with the word 'Detectives.' 
Ms. Munson identified herself and asked if Brian Burbine 
was being held; the person responded affirmatively, Ms. 
Munson explained to the person that Burbine was repre-
sented by attorney Casparian who was not available; she 
further stated that she would act as Burbine's legal coun-
sel in the event that the police intended to place him in a 
lineup or question him. The unidentified person told 
Ms. Munson that the police would not be questioning 
Burbine or putting him in a lineup and that they were 
through with him for the night. Ms. Munson was not 
informed that the Providence Police were at the Cran-
ston police station or that Burbine was a suspect in 
Mary's murder.'' State v. Burbine, 451 A. 2d 22, 23-24 
(1982). 
At all relevant times, respondent was unaware of his sister's 
efforts to retain counsel and of the fact and contents of Ms. 
Munson's telephone conversation. 
Less than an hour later, the police brought respondent to 
an interrogation room and conducted the first of a series of 
interviews concerning the murder. Prior to each session, re-
spondent was informed of his Miranda rights, and on three 
separate occasions he signed a written form acknowledging 
that he understood his right to the presence of an attorney 
and explicitly indicating that he "did not want an attorney 
called or appointed for [him]" before he gave a statement. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 94, 103, 107. At least twice during 
the course of the evening, respondent was left in a room 
where he had access to a telephone, which he apparently de-
clined to use. Record of Suppression Hearing 23, 85. 
Eventually, respondent signed three written statements 
fully admitting to the murder. 
Prior to trial, respondent moved to suppress the state-
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ent had received the Miranda warnings and had "knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his privilege against self 
incrimination [and] his right to counsel." App. 116. Reject-
ing the contrary testimony of the police, the court found that 
Ms. Munson did telephone the detective bureau on the eve-
ning in question, but concluded that "there was no . . . con-
spiracy or collusion on the part of the Cranston Police De-
partment to secrete this defendant from his attorney." Id. , 
at 114. In any event, the court held, the constitutional right 
to request the presence of an attorney belongs solely to the 
defendant and may not be asserted by his lawyer. Because 
the evidence was clear that respondent never asked for the 
services of an attorney, the telephone call had no relevance to 
the validity of the waiver or the admissibility of the 
statements. 
The jury found respondent guilty of murder in the first de-
gree, and he appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 
A divided court rejected his contention that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution required the 
suppression of the inculpatory statements and affirmed the 
conviction. Failure to inform respondent of Ms. Munson's 
efforts to represent him, the court held, did not undermine 
the validity of the waivers. "It hardly seems conceivable 
that the additional information that an attorney whom he did 
not know had called the police station would have added sig-
nificantly to the quantum of information necessary for the ac-
cused to make an informed decision as to waiver." 451 A. 
2d, at 29. Nor, the court concluded, did Miranda v. Ari-
zona, supra, or any other decision of this Court independ-
ently require the police to honor Ms. Munson's request that 
interrogation not proceed in her absence. In reaching that 
conclusion, the court noted that because two different police 
departments were operating in the Cranston station house on 
the evening in question, the record supported the trial court's 
finding that there was no "conspiracy or collusion" to prevent 
Ms. Munson from seeing respondent. Id. , at 30-31 , n. 5. 
-
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In any case, the court held, the right to the presence of coun-
sel belongs solely to the accused and may not be asserted by 
"benign third parties, whether or not they happen to be at-
torneys." Id. , at 28. 
After unsuccessfully petitioning the United States District 
Court for the District of Rhode Island for a writ of habeas 
corpus, 589 F. Supp. 1245 (1984), respondent appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. That court reversed. 
753 F. 2d 178 (1985). Finding it unnecessary to reach any 
arguments under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
the court held that the police's conduct had fatally tainted re-
spondent's "otherwise valid" waiver of his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self incrimination and right to counsel. Id. , 
at 184. The court reasoned that by failing to inform re-
spondent that an attorney had called and that she had been 
assured that no questioning would take place until the next 
day, the police had deprived respondent of information cru-
cial to his ability to waive his rights knowingly and intelli-
gently. The court also found that the record would support 
"no other explanation for the refusal to tell Burbine of Attor-
ney Munson's call than .. . deliberate or reckless irrespon-
sibility." Id. , at 185. This kind of "blameworthy action by 
the police," the court concluded, together with respondent's 
ignorance of the telephone call, "vitiate[d] any claim that 
[the] waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary." Id., at 
187. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether a pre-arraignment 
confession preceded by an otherwise valid waiver must be 
suppressed either because the police misinformed an inquir-
ing attorney about their plans concerning the suspect or 
because they failed to inform the suspect of the attorney's 
efforts to reach him. -- U. S. -- (1985). We now 
reverse. 
II 
In Miranda v. Arizona, supra, the Court recognized that 




MORAN v. BURBINE 
-
"compelling pressures which work to undermine the individ-
ual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would 
not otherwise do so freely." 384 U. S. , at 467. To combat 
this inherent compulsion, and thereby protect the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self incrimination, Miranda 
imposed on the police an obligation to follow certain proce-
dures in their dealings with the accused. In particular, prior 
to the initiation of questioning, they must fully apprise the 
_suspect of the state's intention to use his statements to se-
cure a conviction, and must inform him of his rights to remain 
silent and to "have counsel present, if [he] so desires. " Id. , 
at 468-470. Beyond this duty to inform, Miranda requires 
that the police respect the accused's decision to exercise the 
rights outlined in the warnings. "If the individual indicates 
in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning 
that he wishes to remain silent, [or if he] states that he wants 
an attorney, the interrogation must cease." Miranda, 384 
U. S. , at 473-474. See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 
477 (1981). 
Respondent does not dispute that the Providence police fol-
lowed these procedures with precision. The record amply 
supports the state-court findings that the police administered 
the required warnings, sought to assure that respondent un-
derstood his rights, and obtained an express written waiver 
prior to eliciting each of the three statements. Nor does re-
spondent contest the Rhode Island courts' determination that 
he at no point requested the presence of a lawyer. He con-
tends instead that the confessions must be suppressed be-
cause the police's failure to inform him of the attorney's tele-
phone call deprived him of information essential to his ability 
to knowingly waive his Fifth Amendment rights. In the al-
ternative, he suggests that to fully protect the Fifth Amend-
ment values served by Miranda, we should extend that deci-
sion to condemn the conduct of the Providence police. We 
address each contention in turn. 
-
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Echoing the standard first articulated in Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938), Miranda holds that "[t]he 
defendant may waive effectuation" of the rights conveyed in 
the warnings "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently." 384 U. S., at 444, 475. The 
inquiry has two distinct dimensions. Edwards v. Arizona, 
supra, at 404; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 404 (1977). 
First the relinquishment of the right must have been volun-
tary in the sense that it was the product of a free and delib-
erate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. 
Second, the waiver must have been made with a full aware-
ness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the 
consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the "to-
tality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" re-
veal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of com-
prehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda 
rights have been waived. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 
707, 725 (1979). See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 
u. s. 369, 374-375 (1979). 
Under this standard, we have no doubt that respondent 
validly waived his right to remain silent and to the presence 
of counsel. The voluntariness of the waiver is not at issue. 
As the Court of Appeals correctly acknowledged, the record 
is devoid of any suggestion that police resorted to physical or 
psychological pressure to elicit the statements. 753 F. 2d, at 
184. Indeed it appears that it was respondent, and not the 
police, who spontaneously initiated the conversation that led 
to the first and most damaging confession. Id., at 180. Cf. 
Edwards v. Arizona, supra. Nor is there any question 
about respondent's comprehension of the full panoply of 
rights set out in the Miranda warnings and of the potential 
consequences of a decision to relinquish them. Nonetheless, 
the Court of Appeals believed that the "[d]eliberate or reck-
less" conduct of the police, in particular their failure to inform 
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lidity of the otherwise proper waiver. We find this conclu-
sion untenable as a matter of both logic and precedent. 
Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect 
and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on 
the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a con-
stitutional right. Under the analysis of the Court of Ap-
peals, the same defendant, armed with the same information 
and confronted with precisely the same police conduct, would 
have knowingly waived his Miranda rights had a lawyer not 
telephoned the police station to inquire about his status. 
Nothing in any of our waiver decisions or in our understand-
ing of the essential components of a valid waiver requires so 
incongruous a result. No doubt the additional information 
would have been useful to respondent; perhaps even it might 
have affected his decision to confess. But we have never 
read the Constitution to require that the police supply a sus-
pect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self 
interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights. 
See, e. g., Oregon v. Elstad, -- U. S. --, -- (1985); 
United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 188 (1977). Cf. 
Hill v. Lockhart, ante, at --; M cM ann v. Richardson, 397 
U. S. 759, 769 (1970). Once it is determined that a suspect's 
decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all 
times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and 
that he was aware of the state's intention to use his state-
ments to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the 
waiver is valid as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals' 
conclusion to the contrary was in error. 
Nor do we believe that the level of the police's culpability 
in failing to inform respondent of the telephone call has any 
bearing on the validity of the waiver. In light of the state-
court findings that there was no "conspiracy or collusion" on 
the part of the police, 451 A. 2d, at 30-31, n. 5, we have seri-
ous doubts about whether the Court of Appeals was free to 
conclude that their conduct constituted "deliberate or reck-
less irresponsibility." 753 F. 2d, at 187; see 28 U. S. C. 
-
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§ 2254(d). But whether intentional or inadvertent, the state 
of mind of the police is irrelevant to the question of the intelli-
gence and voluntariness of respondent's election to abandon 
his rights. Although highly inappropriate, even deliberate 
deception of an attorney could not possibly affect a suspect's 
decision to waive his Miranda rights unless he were at least 
aware of the incident. Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 
U. S. 478, 481 (1964) (excluding confession where police in-
correctly told the suspect that his lawyer "'didn't want to see' 
him.") Nor was the failure to inform respondent of the tele-
phone call the kind of "trick[ery]" that can vitiate the validity 
of a waiver. Miranda, 384 U. S., at 476. Granting that the 
"deliberate or reckless" withholding of information is objec-
tionable as a matter or ethics, such conduct is only relevant to 
the constitutional validity of a waiver if it deprives a defend-
ant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the na-
ture or his rights and the consequences of abandoning them. 
Because respondent's voluntary decision to speak was made 
with full awareness and comprehension of all the information 
Miranda requires the police to convey, the waivers were 
valid. 
B 
At oral argument respondent acknowledged that a con-
stitutional rule requiring the police to inform a suspect of an 
attorney's efforts to reach him would represent a significant 
extension of our precedents. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32-33. He 
contends, however, that the conduct of the Providence police 
was so inimical to the Fifth Amendment values Miranda 
seeks to protect that we should read that decision to condemn 
their behavior. Regardless of any issue of waiver, he urges, 
the Fifth Amendment requires the reversal of a conviction if 
the police are less than forthright in their dealings with an 
attorney or if they fail to tell a suspect of a lawyer's unilateral 
efforts to contact him. Because the proposed modification 
ignores the underlying purposes of the Miranda rules and be-
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balance between society's legitimate law enforcement inter-
ests and the protection of the defendant's Fifth Amendment 
rights, we decline the invitation to further extend Miranda's 
reach. 
At the outset, while we share respondent's distaste for the 
deliberate misleading of an officer of the court, reading 
Miranda to forbid police deception of an attorney "would cut 
the [decision] completely loose from its own explicitly stated 
rationale." Beckwith v. United States, 425 U. S. 341, 345 
(1976). As is now well established, "[t]he Miranda warnings 
are 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but 
[are] instead measures to insure that the [suspect's] right 
against compulsory self incrimination [is] protected. ' " New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.--, -- (1984), quoting Michi-
gan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 444 (1974). Their objective is 
not to mold police conduct for its own sake. Nothing in the 
Constitution vests in us the authority to mandate a code of 
behavior for state officials wholly unconnected to any federal 
right or privilege. The purpose of the Miranda warnings in-
stead is to dissipate the compulsion inherent in custodial in-
terrogation and, in so doing, guard against abridgement of 
the suspect's Fifth Amendment rights. Clearly, a rule that 
focuses on how the police treat an attorney-conduct that has 
no relevance at all to the degree of compulsion experienced 
by the defendant during interrogation-would ignore both 
Miranda's mission and its only source of legitimacy. 
Nor are we prepared to adopt a rule requiring that the 
police inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts to reach him. 
While such a rule might add marginally to Miranda's goal of 
dispelling the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, 
overriding practical considerations counsel against its adop-
tion. As we have stressed on numerous occasions," [o]ne of 
the principal advantages" of Miranda is the ease and clarity 
of its application. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. --, 
-- (1984); see also New York v. Quarles, supra, at --
(concurring opinion); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S., at 718. 
-
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We have little doubt that the approach urged by respondent 
and endorsed by the Court of Appeals would have the inev-
itable consequence of muddying Miranda's otherwise rela-
tively clear waters. The legal questions it would spawn are 
legion: To what extent should the police be held accountable 
for knowing that the accused has counsel? Is it enough that 
someone in the station house knows, or must the interrogat-
ing officer himself know of counsel's efforts to contact the 
suspect? Do counsel's efforts to talk to the suspect concern-
ing one criminal investigation trigger the obligation to inform 
the defendant before interrogation may proceed on a wholly 
separate matter? We are unwilling to modify Miranda in 
manner that would so clearly undermine the decision's cen-
tral "virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specific-
ity .. . what they may do in conducting [a] custodial interro-
gation, and of informing courts under what circumstances 
statements obtained during such interrogation are admissi-
ble." Fare v. Michael C., supra, at 718. 
Moreover, problems of clarity to one side, reading 
Miranda to require the police in each instance to inform a 
suspect of an attorney's effort's to reach him would work a 
substantial and, we think, inappropriate shift in the subtle 
balance struck in that decision. Custodial interrogations im-
plicate two competing concerns. On the one hand, "the need 
for police questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of 
criminal laws" cannot be doubted. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 225 (1973). Admissions of guilt 
are more than merely "desirable," United States v. Washing-
ton, 431 U. S., at 186; they are essential to society's compel-
ling interest in finding, convicting and punishing those who 
violate the law. On the other hand, the Court has recog-
nized that the interrogation process is "inherently coercive" 
and that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk 
that the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line be-
tween legitimate efforts to elicit admissions and constitution-




MORAN v. BURBINE 
-
supra, at --. Miranda attempted to reconcile these op-
posing concerns by giving the defendant the power to exert 
some control over the course of the interrogation. Declining 
to adopt the more extreme position that the actual presence 
of a lawyer was necessary to dispel the coercion inherent in 
custodial interrogation, see Brief for American Civil Liber-
ties Union as Amicus Curiae in Miranda v. Arizona, 0. T. 
1965, No. 789, p. 22-31, the Court found that the suspect's 
Fifth Amendment rights could be adequately protected by 
less intrusive means. Incommunicado questioning, often an 
essential part of the investigatory process, could continue in 
its traditional form, the Court held, but only if the suspect 
clearly understood that, at any time, he could bring the pro-
ceeding to a halt or, short of that, call in an attorney to give 
advice and monitor the conduct of his interrogators. 
The position urged by respondent would upset this care-
fully drawn approach in a manner that" is both unnecessary 
for the protection of the Fifth Amendent privilege and injuri-
ous to legitimate law enforcement. Because, as Miranda 
squarely holds, full comprehension of the rights to remain si-
lent and request an attorney are sufficient to dispel whatever 
coercion is inherent in the interrogation process, a rule re-
quiring the police to inform the suspect of an attorney's ef-
forts to contact him would contribute to the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege only incidentally, if at all. This 
minimal benefit, however, would come at a substantial cost to 
society's legitimate and substantial interest in securing ad-
missions of guilt. Indeed, the very premise of the Court of 
Appeals was not that awareness of Ms. Munson's phone call 
would have dissipated the coercion of the interrogation room, 
but that it might have convinced respondent not to speak at 
all. 753 F. 2d, at 185. Because neither the letter nor pur-
poses of Miranda require this additional handicap on other-
wise permissible investigatory efforts, we are unwilling to 
expand the Miranda rules to require the police to keep the 
suspect abreast of the status of his legal representation. 









Respondent also contends that the Sixth Amendment re-
quires exclusion of his three confessions.* It is clear, of 
course, that, absent a valid waiver, the defendant has the 
right to the presence of an attorney during any interrogation 
occurring after the first formal charging proceeding, the 
point at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel initially 
attaches. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. --, --
(1984); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689 (1972) (opinion of 
Stewart, J.) See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 
400-401 (1977). And we readily agree that once the right 
has attached, it follows that the police may not interfere with 
the efforts of a defendant's attorney to act as a "'medium' be-
tween [the~] and the State" during the interrogation. 
Maine v. Moulton, ante, at--; see Brewer v. Williams, 
supra, at 401, n. 8. The difficulty for respondent is that the 
interrogation sessions that yielded the inculpatory state-
ments took place before the initiation of "adversary judicial 
proceedings." United States v. Gouveia, supra, at --. 
He contends, however, that this circumstance is not fatal to 
his Sixth Amendment claim. At least in some situations, he 
argues, the Sixth Amendment protects the integrity of the 
attorney-client relationship regardless of whether the pros-
ecution has in fact commenced "by way of formal charge, pre-
liminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment." 
Ibid. Placing principal reliance on a footnote in Miranda, 
384 U. S., at 465, n. 35, and on Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, 
*Petitioner does not argue that respondent's valid waiver of his Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel necessarily served to waive his parallel rights 
under the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, we have no occasion to con-
sider whether a waiver for one purpose necessarily operates as a general 
waiver of the right to counsel for all purposes. 
We note also that, notwithstanding the state-court finding that no attor-
ney client relationship existed between respondent and Ms. Munson, State 
v. Burbine, SU'[)'T'a , at 29, petitioner now concedes that such a relationship 
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he maintains that Gouveia, Kirby and our other "critical 
stage" cases, concern only the narrow question of when the 
right to counsel-that is, to the appointment or presence of 
counsel-attaches. The right to non-interference with an at-
torney's dealings with a criminal suspect, he asserts, arises 
the moment that the relationship is formed, or, at the very 
least, once the defendant is placed in custodial interrogation. 
We are not persuaded. At the outset, subsequent deci-
sions foreclose any reliance on Escobedo and Miranda for the 
proposition that the Sixth Amendment right, in any of its 
manifestations, applies prior to the initiation of adversary 
judicial proceedings. Although Escobedo was originally de-
cided as a Sixth Amendment case, "the Court in retrospect 
perceived that the 'prime purpose' of Escobedo was not to 
vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such but, like 
Miranda, 'to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination . . . . '" Kirby v. Illinois , supra, 
at 689, quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 729 
(1966). Clearly then, Escobedo provides no support for re-
spondent's argument. Nor, of course, does Miranda , the 
holding of which rested exclusively on the Fifth Amendment. 
Thus, the decision's brief observation about the reach of 
Escobedo's Sixth Amendment analysis is not only dictum, but 
reflects an understanding of the case that the Court has ex-
pressly disavowed. See also, United States v. Gouveia, --
U. S. , at --, n. 5; Y. Kamisar, Police Interrogation and 
Confessions 217-218, n. 94. 
Questions of precedent to one side, we find respondent's 
understanding of the Sixth Amendment both practically and 
theoretically unsound. As a practical matter, it makes little 
sense to say that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at-
taches at different times depending on the fortuity of 
whether the suspect or his family happens to have retained 
counsel prior to interrogation. Cf. Kamisar 220-221. More 
importantly, the suggestion that the existence of an attorney-
client relationship itself triggers the protections of the Sixth 
-
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Amendment misconceives the underlying purposes of the 
right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment's intended function 
is not to wrap a protective cloak around the attorney-client 
relationship for its own sake any more than it is to protect a 
suspect from the consequences of his own candor. Its pur-
pose, rather, is to assure that in any "criminal prosecution[]," 
U. S. Const., Arndt. 6, the accused shall not be left to his 
own devices in facing the "prosecutorial forces of organized 
society." Maine v. Moulton, ante, at-- (quoting Kirby v. 
Illinois, supra, at 689). By its very terms, it becomes appli-
cable only when the government's role shifts from investiga-
tion to accusation. For it is only then that the assistance of 
one versed in the "intricacies ... of law," id., is needed to 
assure that the prosecution's case encounters "the crucible of 
meaningful adversarial testing." United States v. Cronic, 
466 U. s. - , - (1984). 
Indeed, in Maine v. Moulton, supra, decided this term, 
the Court again confirmed that looking to the initiation of ad-
versary judicial proceedings, far from being mere formalism, 
is fundamental to the proper application of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. There, we considered the constitu-
tional implications of a surreptitious investigation that 
yielded evidence pertaining to two crimes. For one, the de-
fendant had been indicted; for the other, he had not. Con-
cerning the former, the Court reaffirmed that after the first 
charging proceeding the government may not deliberately 
elicit incriminating statements from an accused out of the 
presence of counsel. See also, Massiah v. United States, 
377 U. S. 201 (1964). The Court made clear, however, that 
the evidence concerning the crime for which the defendant 
had not been indicted-evidence obtained in precisely the 
same manner from the identical suspect-would be admissi-
ble at a trial limited to those charges. Maine v. Moulton, 
ante, at -- and --, n. 16. The clear implication of the 
holding, and one that confirms the teaching of Gouveia, is 
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until after the initiation of formal charges. Moreover, be-
cause Moulton already had legal representation, the decision 
all but forecloses respondent's argument that the attorney-
client relationship itself triggers the Sixth Amendment right. 
Respondent contends, however, that custodial interroga-
tions require a different rule. Because confessions elicited 
during the course of police questioning often seal a suspect's 
fate , he argues, the need for an advocate-and the concomi-
tant right to non-interference with the attorney-client rela-
tionship-is at its zenith, regardless of whether the state has 
initiated the first adversary judicial proceeding. We do not 
doubt that a lawyer's presence could be of value to the sus-
pect; and we readily agree that if a suspect confesses, his at-
torney's case at trial will be that much more difficult. But 
these concerns are no more decisive in this context than they 
were for the the equally damaging pre-indictment lineup at 
issue in Kirby, or the statements pertaining to the unindicted 
crime elicted from the defendant in Maine v. Moulton. 
Compare United States v. Wade , 388 U. S. 218, 226-227 
(1967) (Sixth Amendment attaches at post-indictment 
lineup); Massiah v. United States , supra, (after indictment, 
police may not elicit statements from suspect out of the pres-
ence of counsel). For an interrogation, no more or less than 
for any other "critical" pre-trial event, the possibility that the 
encounter may have important consequences at trial, stand-
ing alone, is insufficient to trigger the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. As Gouveia made clear, until such time as 
the "government has committed itself to prosecute, and . . . 
the adverse positions of government and defendant have 
solidified" the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not 
attach. United States v. Gouveia, supra, at -- (quoting 
Kirby v. Illinois , 406 U. S., at 689.). 
Because, as respondent acknowledges , the events that led 
to the inculpatory statements preceded the formal initiation 
of adversary judicial proceedings, we reject the contention 
~ . -
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that the conduct of the police violated his rights under the 
Sixth Amendment. 
IV 
Finally, respondent contends that the conduct of the police 
was so offensive as to deprive him of the fundamental fair-
ness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Focusing primarily on the impropriety 
of conveying false information to an attorney, he invites us to 
declare that such behavior should be condemned as violative 
of canons fundamental to the "traditions and conscience of 
our people." Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 169 
(1952), quoting Snyder v. Commonwealth, 291 U. S. 97 
(1934). We do not foreclose the possibility that on facts 
more egregious then those presented here police deception 
might rise to the level of a due process violation. On this 
record, however, we conclude that the challenged conduct 
falls short of the kind of behavior that so shocks the sensibil-
ities of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into 
the criminal processes of the states. 
We hold therefore that the Court of Appeals erred in find-
ing that the Federal Constitution required the exclusion of 
the three inculpatory statements. Accordingly, we reverse 
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
' 
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TO: Justice Powell ~/- 1,..--t., 4~_,~J.,, 
FROM: Bill p~~/-~ 
DATE: January 3, 1986 &,/./.,.,.,... lo 5 DC  
RE: Moran v. Burbine, No. 84-1485 ~ )4JJOD61't..z.-
Justice O'Connor's draft Opinion t~ 
l-d~..._ __ i~~ 
S~JL(.~~~ 
~~7~~/~ 
This is the case in which the lawyer (Munson) 
called the police station and was told that Burbine (who 
was then being detained at the station) would not be 
questioned any more that day. Burbine was questioned that 
evening, and confessed to a murder. Burbine was never 
told about Munson's call; nor was Munson advised that 
Burbine was a suspect in a murder investigation. CAl held 
that Burbine's Miranda waiver was involuntary. This Court 
voted 6-3 to reverse. 
Except for part Ill (pages 13-17), I agree with 
~
everything in Justice O'Connor's opinion. 
I have a problem with part 111, however. In that 
section, Justice O'Connor analyzes the argument that "the 
Sixth Amendment protects the integrity of the attorney-
client relationship" regardless of whether adversary 
-
proceedings have commenced. 
under United States v. Gouveia, 





She finds that, 
(1985), the 
This answer is correct in my view, but the question 
is not presented on this record. As Justice O'Connor 
recognizes 1n footnote * (p. 13), the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court explicitly found that no attorney-Qlient 
relationship existed between Burbine and Munson. That 
finding is either a finding of fact, and therefore 
entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 u.s.c. 
§2254 (d), or a conclusion of state law to which federal 
courts (including 





bound. Given that 
the Sixth Amendment 
protects a non-existent "relationship" between an 
attorney-volunteer and a would-be client whom the attorney 
has never met, at a time prior to the beginning of 
adversary proceedings. That issue seems easy. The Court 
should not go on to decide whether there are any Sixth 
Amendment limits on police interference in existing 
attorney-client relationships. 
Justice O'Connor avoids this problem by noting that 
the State has conceded that there was an attorney-client 
relationship on these facts. (p. 13, n. *) It's true 
\ 
~ 
- - 3. 
that the State's lawyer made such a concession at oral 
argument, but I don't see how that matters. Lawyers' 
remarks at oral argument can't alter the record, nor can 
~ 
they erase the state court's factual (or legal) finding. 
I'm not sure what to recommend. You could send 
Justice O'Connor a brief memorandum noting your concern. 
Alternatively, you could join parts 1, 11, and IV, with a 
two- or three-sentence opinion explaining why the issue 
addressed in part Ill is not really presented here. But 
since part Ill is subs tan ti vely correct, and since the 
problem I have might easily be fixed by some relatively 
innocuous word changes (and a revision of the footnote on 
page 13) , it might be best for me simply to discuss the 
issue with the clerk who worked on this case. If you 
agree, you should go ahead and join the whole opinion and 
I'll talk to Justice O'Connor's clerk. 
I would of course be happy to draft either a short 
memorandum to Justice O'Connor or a short opinion; neither 




JUSTI CE BYRON R . WHITE 
- -
,~tmt <!Jtturi ttf tlrt ~tb ~taftg 
Jluqingutn. ~- <!J. 20ffeJl.~ 
January 3, 1986 
84-1485 - Moran v. Burbine 
Dear Sandra, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice O'Connor 




JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
-
.ilupnuu ~01trl gf t4~ :J{nittb' $taus 
JruJfbtgton. ~- ~ 2Dp'!, 
January 3, 1986 
Re: 84-1485 - Moran v. Burbine 
Dear Sandra: 




Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMIISERS O F 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
- -~tfflt <lfmtti Gt f4t ~ .itatt.1 
~1fi:ngton. ,. ~. 21lc?~~ 
January 6, 1986 
No. 84-1485 
Moran v. Burbine 
Dear Sandra, 





Copies to the Conference 
/ 
f ~  -
/jdl ~ 
5~ 
TO: Justice Powell 'l? K Jo 
FROM: Bill qt 
DATE: January 6, 1986 ~ 
RE: Moran v. Burbine, No. 84-1485 , I 1,.J v;,~ 





I have read your fine opini~ s case, and I 
join it. I write to suggest .some- aJ.ee.J;~ art 
~ 
the section that discusses Burbine's Sixth Amendment 
claim. 
In part III, your opinion analyzes the argument 
that "the Sixth Amendment protects the integrity of the 
attorney-client relationship" regardless 





I .am" not 
11,..,rs,z'i.'-I-
~ th i s question is presented on the record before us. 
'\ 
As you recognize in the footnote on page 13, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court expressly found that no attorney-
client relationship existed between Burbine and Munson,. 
~ - -
e public defender who contacte"a the 
police stati In my view, the State's concessio 
cannot alter that finding, which is part of the record in 
this case. 
Amendment 
The question, then, is whether the Sixth 
protects against police interference in 
incipient relationships between an attorney-volunteer and 
a "client" whom the attorney has never met. That question 
is easily answered in the negative. 
I have two alternative suggestions. My preference 
is that part Ill be considerably shortened, with the 
conclusion resting largely on the absence of any 
relationship between Burbine and Munson. Alternatively, I 
would suggest that you acknowledge the state-court finding 
that there was no attorney-client relationship and then go 
on to state that even were such a relationship present the 
Sixth Amendment would not offer the protection Burbine 
seeks, for the reasons you persuasively express on pages 
14-16. 
~'°-1.tk 
I would omit the second paragraph of ~ on 
page 13. 
A /\ 
My join is not conditioned on either suggestion. 
As I said, you have written a fine opinion. 
7 
- m -
January 6, J 986 
84-1485 Moran v. Burbin~ 
Dear Sandra, 
! have read your fine opinion in this case, and I 
will join j_t. I write to suggest possible changes in part 
III, the section that discusses Burbine' s Si.~th Amendment 
claim. 
In part III, your ooinion analyzes the argument that 
"the Sixth Amendment protects the integrity of the attorneu-
client relationship" regardless of whether aclversar.v -pro-
ceedings have cornMencen. (o. 13) T hav0 not thought t 1·lis 
qui=>stion is presented on the record before us. As you rec-
ogniz~ in the footnote on page 13, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court expressly found th.:it no attorney-client relationship 
ex:i.sted between Bur.Mine ~na Munson. In my view, the State's 
concession at argument cannot alter. that finning, which is 
part ot the recnra i ~ thjs case. The question, then, is 
whether the Sixth Amendment protects against police inter-
ference in incipient relationships between an attorney-
volunteer and a "client" whom the attorney has never met. 
That question is easily a~swercd ln the negative. 
I have two alternative suggestions. My preference is 
that part III be considerably shortened, with the conclusion 
resting largelv on the absence of any relationship between 
Burbine and Munson. Alternatively, I would suggest that you 
acknowledge the state-court finding that there was no attor-
ney-client relationship and then go on to state that even 
were such a relationshj_p present the Sixth Amendment would 
not offer. the protection Burbine seeks, for the reasons you 
persuasively express on pages 14-16. I would omit the sec-
ond paragraph of the footnote on oage 13. 
My joi.n is not con,Htioned on your adopting either 
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-Dear Lewis, 
Thank you for your letter indicating that you could 
join the above opinion and suggesting some possible 
modifications in the Sixth Amendment analysis. You express 
some concern that the state court's finding that no attorney 
client relationship existed might make it inappropriate to 
decide the Sixth Amendment issue on the assumption that such 
a relationship did exist. You also suggest that the issue 
is not "concedable." I assume that this suggestion is 
premised on the view that the existence of an 
attorney/client relationship is either a question of fact or 
of state law. 
The question you pose is a difficult one, and one 
which I wrestled with in the course of drafting the opinion. 
Before determining what adjustments to undertake to meet 
your concerns, I thought it might be useful to set out the 
considerations that led me to conclude the Sixth Amendment 
issue was properly presented. 
As your letter indicates, we are in agreement that 
the s ~ ·· ._ ,.. .,. - - - .,, - - - · ~ r,,°J:2 E:: I h liS . n 
at tor J . 1 D S~~~C,V\'\l-'4.t l:, vtot 1Jtu\ ior 
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A a. ~v .. ~1~K...~ / ~---~ ~-••~:, ·, t · men . ; ... _ . ~~ I ~,.-., a 10n 
"adve ~ . M_J. J01A.L 70 . 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'cONNOR 
Dear Lewis, 
January 7 , 1985 
No. 84-1485 Moran 
~~~~ 
~~ h~~ 
v. Burbine J ~ ;) / 
Thank you for your letter indicating that you could 
join the above opinion and suggesting some possible 
modifications in the Sixth Amendment analysis. You express 
some concern that the state court's finding that no attorney 
client relationship existed might make it inappropriate to 
decide the Sixth Amendment issue on the assumption that such 
a relationship did exist. You also suggest that the issue 
is not "concedable." I assume that this suggestion is 
premised on the view that the existence of an 
attorney/client relationship is either a question of fact or 
of state law. 
The question you pose is a difficult one, and one 
which I wrestled with in the course of drafting the opinion. 
Before determining what adjustments to undertake to meet 
your concerns, I thought it might be useful to set out the 
considerations that led me to conclude the Sixth Amendment 
issue was properly presented. 
As your letter indicates, we are in agreement that 
the Sixth Amendment does not protect -~he integrity of an 
attorney's dealings with his or her client, at least prior 
to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. We are 
presented then with a somewhat counterintuitive 
hypothetical: If the Sixth Amendment did protect the 
relationship, what law--state or federal--would define 
whether such a relationship existed? For the present, at 
least, I have concluded that the Sixth Amendment itself 
would decide whether on any particular set of facts the kind 
of relationship the Sixth Amendment might protect existed. 
By way of analogy, it is established that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel only attaches upon the initiation 
"adversary judicial proceedings." It seems to me that 
- - 2. 
federal law would define whether a particular charging event 
was the kind of circumstance that triggered the Sixth 
Amendment right, regardless of how the state characterized 
it. Similarly, whether a certain constellation of 
historical facts--e.g. a phone call by an assistant public 
defender concerning another crime or a permanent retainer 
agreement--is sufficient to trigger Sixth Amendment 
concerns, would have a federal definition. 
I note also that respondent's argument, although a 
bit difficult to follow, does not focus on whether an 
attorney/client relationship existed as a formal matter of 
state law. He argues instead that, on these facts, the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated. On Page 
28 of his brief, for example, he states: "Brian Burbine's 
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel had accrued at the time of 
his interrogations because he had an attorney who had 
contacted the police, and affirmatively attempted to 
intercede on his behalf." Part III reflects an effort to 
respond to this erroneous contention, a task that, in my 
view, the opinion should undertake to completely dispose of 
the case. 
I would like to accommodate your concerns, perhaps 
by deleting the second paragraph of the footnote and briefly 
outlining some of the thoughts contained in this letter. I 
would prefer, however, not to change the opinion in a manner 
that would suggest that the Sixth Amendment analysis was 
merely dictum. Perhaps the footnote could say something 
along the lines of the following: 
Notwithstanding the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court's finding that, as a matter of state 
law, no attorney/client relationship existed 
between respondent and Ms. Munson, the Sixth 
Amendment issue is properly before us. State 
v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 29 (1982). 
Pet1t1oner now concedes that such a 
relationship exists and invites us to decide 
the Sixth Amendment question based on that 
concession. Of course, a litigant's 
concession cannot be used to circumvent the 
rule that this Court may not disregard a 
state court's interpretation of state law. 
Respondent's argument, however, does not 
focus on whether an attorney/client 
relationship actually existed as a formal 
matter of state law. He argues instead that, 
on the particular facts of this case, the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been 
- -
violated. We address respondent's argument 
because, in any event, the type of 
circumstances that give rise to a Sixth 
Amendment right would have a federal 
definition. 
If something along these lines would meet your 
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From: Justice O'Connor 
/ 
Circulated: ------
Recirculated: ru • I 3 190 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-1485 
JOHN MORAN, SUPERINTENDENT, RHODE ISLAND 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PETITIONER 
v. BRIAN K. BURBINE 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1986] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
After.being informed of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and after executing a series of 
written waivers, respondent confessed to the murder of · a 
young woman. At no point during the course of the interro-
gation, which occurred prior to arraignment, did he request 
an attorney. While he was in police custody, his sister at-
tempted to retain a lawyer to represent him. The attorney 
telephoned the police station and received assurances that re-
spondent would not be questioned further until the next day. 
In fact, the interrogation session that yielded the inculpatory 
statements began later that evening. The question pre-
sented is whether either the conduct of the police or respond-
ent's ignorance of the attorney's efforts to reach him taints 
the validity of the waivers and therefore requires exclusion of 
the confessions. 
I 
On the morning of March 3, 1977, Mary Jo Hickey was 
found unconscious in a factory parking lot in Providence, 
Rhode Island. Suffering from injuries to her skull appar-
ently inflicted by a metal pipe found at the scene, she was 
rushed to a nearby hospital. Three weeks later she died 





MORAN v. BURBINE 
-
Several months after her death, the Cranston, Rhode Is-
land police arrested respondent and two others in connection 
with a local burglary. Shortly before the arrest, Detective 
Ferranti of the Cranston police force had learned from a con-
fidential informant that the man responsible for Ms. Hickey's 
death lived at a certain address and went by the name of 
"Butch." Upon discovering that respondent lived at that ad-
dress and was known by that name, Detective Ferranti in-
formed respondent of his Miranda rights. When respondent 
refused to execute a written waiver, Detective Ferranti 
spoke separately with the two other suspects arrested on the 
breaking and entering charge and obtained statements fur-
ther implicating respondent in Ms. Hickey's murder. At ap-
proximately 6:00 p. m., Detective Ferranti telephoned the 
police in Providence to convey the information he had uncov-
ered. An hour later, three officers from that department ar-
rived at the Cranston headquarters for the purpose of ques-
tioning respondent about the murder. 
That same evening, at about 7:45 p. m., respondent's sister 
telephoned the Public Defender's Office to obtain legal assist-
ance for her brother. Her sole concern was the breaking and 
entering charge, as she was unaware that respondent was 
then under suspicion for murder. She asked for Richard 
Casparian who had been scheduled to meet with respondent 
earlier that afternoon to discuss another charge unrelated to 
either the break-in or the murder. As soon as the conversa-
tion ended, the attorney who took the call attempted to reach 
Mr. Casparian. When those efforts were unsuccessful, she 
telephoned Allegra Munson, another Assistant Public De-
fender, and told her about respondent's arrest and his sister's 
subsequent request that the office represent him. 
At 8:15 p. m., Ms. Munson telephoned the Cranston police 
station and asked that her call be transferred to the detective 
division. In the words of the Supreme Court of Rhode Is-
land, whose factual findings we treat as presumptively cor-
-
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rect, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), the conversation proceeded as 
follows: 
"A male voice responded with the word 'Detectives.' 
Ms. Munson identified herself and asked if Brian Burbine 
was being held; the person responded affirmatively. 
Ms. Munson explained to the person that Burbine was 
represented by attorney Casparian who was not avail-
able; she further stated that she would act as Burbine's 
legal counsel in the event that the police intended to 
place him in a lineup or question him. The unidentified 
person told Ms. Munson that the police would not be 
questioning Burbine or putting him in a lineup and that 
they were through with him for the night. Ms. Munson 
was not informed that the Providence Police were at the 
Cranston police station or that Burbine was a suspect in 
Mary's murder." State v. Burbine, 451 A. 2d 22, 23-24 
(1982). 
At all relevant times, respondent was unaware of his sister's 
efforts to retain counsel and of the fact and contents of Ms. 
Munson's telephone conversation. 
Less than an hour later, the police brought respondent to 
an interrogation room and conducted the first of a series of 
interviews concerning the murder. Prior to each session, re-
spondent was informed of his Miranda rights, and on three 
separate occasions he signed a written form acknowledging 
that he understood his right to the presence of an attorney 
and explicitly indicating that he "[did] not want an attorney 
called or appointed for [him]" before he gave a statement. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 94, 103, 107. At least twice during 
the course of the evening, respondent was left in a room 
where he had access to a telephone, which he apparently de-
clined to use. Tr. of Suppression Hearing 23, 85. Eventu-
ally, respondent signed three written statements fully admit-
ting to the murder. 
Prior to trial, respondent moved to suppress the state-
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ent had received the Miranda warnings and had "knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his privilege against 
self-incrimination [and] his right to counsel." App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 116. Rejecting the contrary testimony of the 
police, the court found that Ms. Munson did telephone the 
detective bureau on the evening in question, but concluded 
that "there was no . . . conspiracy or collusion on the part of 
the Cranston Police Department to secrete this defendant 
from his attorney. " Id. , at 114. In any event, the court 
held, the constitutional right to request the presence of an at-
torney belongs solely to the defendant and may not be as-
serted by his lawyer. Because the evidence was clear that 
respondent never asked for the services of an attorney, the 
telephone call had no relevance to the validity of the waiver 
or the admissibility of the statements. 
The jury found respondent guilty of murder in the first de-
gree, and he appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. 
A divided court rejected his contention that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution required the 
suppression of the inculpatory statements and affirmed the 
conviction. Failure to inform respondent of Ms. Munson's 
efforts to represent him, the court held, did not undermine 
the validity of the waivers. "It hardly seems conceivable 
that the additional information that an attorney whom he did 
not know had called the police station would have added sig-
nificantly to the quantum of information necessary for the 
accused to make an informed decision as to waiver." 451 A. 
2d, at 29. Nor, the court concluded, did Miranda v. Ari-
zona, or any other decision of this Court independently 
require the police to honor Ms. Munson's request that in-
terrogation not proceed in her absence. In reaching that 
conclusion, the court noted that because two different police 
departments were operating in the Cranston station house on 
the evening in question, the record supported the trial court's 
finding that there was no "conspiracy or collusion" to prevent 
Ms. Munson from seeing respondent. 451 A. 2d, at 30, n. 5. 
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In any case, the court held, the right to the presence of coun-
sel belongs solely to the accused and may not be asserted by 
"benign third parties, whether or not they happen to be at-
torneys." Id., at 28. 
After unsuccessfully petitioning the United States District 
Court for the District of Rhode Island for a writ of habeas 
corpus, 589 F. Supp. 1245 (1984), respondent appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. That court reversed. 
753 F. 2d 178 (1985). Finding it unnecessary to reach any 
arguments under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
the court held that the police's conduct had fatally tainted 
respondent's "otherwise valid" waiver of his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self incrimination and right to counsel. 
Id., at 184. The court reasoned that by failing to inform re-
spondent that an attorney had called and that she had been 
assured that no questioning would take place until the next 
day, the police had deprived respondent of information cru-
cial to his ability to waive his rights knowingly and intelli-
gently. The court also found that the record would support 
"no other explanation for the refusal to tell Burbine of Attor-
ney Munson's call than ... deliberate or reckless irrespon-
sibility." Id., at 185. This kind of "blameworthy action by 
the police," the court concluded, together with respondent's 
ignorance of the telephone call, "vitiate[d] any claim that 
[the] waiver of counsel° was knowing and voluntary." Id., at 
185, 187. 
We granted certiorari to decide whether a pre-arraignment 
confession preceded by an otherwise valid waiver must be 
suppressed either because the police misinformed an inquir-
ing attorney about their plans concerning the suspect or 
because they failed to inform the suspect of the attorney's 
efforts to reach him. 471 U. S. -- (1985). We now 
reverse. 
II 
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court recognized that custo-
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ling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will 
to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not oth-
erwise do so freely." 384 U. S., at 467. To combat this in-
herent compulsion, and thereby protect the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self incrimination, Miranda imposed 
on the police an obligation to follow certain procedures in 
their dealings with the accused. In particular, prior to the 
initiation of questioning, they must fully apprise the suspect 
of the state's intention to use his statements to secure a con-
viction, and must inform him of his rights to remain silent and 
to "have counsel present .. . if [he] so desires." Id., at 
468-470. Beyond this duty to inform, Miranda requires that 
the police respect the accused's decision to exercise the rights 
outlined in the warnings. "If the individual indicates in any 
inanner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he 
wishes to remain silent, [or if he] states that he wants an at-
torney, the interrogation must cease." Miranda, 384 U. S. , 
at 473-474. See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 
(1981). 
Respondent does not dispute that the Providence police fol-
lowed these procedures with precision. The record amply 
supports the state-court findings that the police administered 
the required warnings, sought to assure that respondent un-
derstood his rights, and obtained an express written waiver 
prior to eliciting each of the three statements. Nor does re-
spondent contest the Rhode Island courts' determination that 
he at no point requested the presence of a lawyer. He con-
tends instead that the confessions must be suppressed be-
cause the police's failure to inform him of the attorney's tele-
phone call deprived him of information essential to his ability 
to knowingly waive his Fifth Amendment rights. In the al-
ternative, he suggests that to fully protect the Fifth Amend-
ment values served by Miranda, we should extend that deci-
sion to condemn the conduct of the Providence police. We 
address each contention in turn. 
-
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Echoing the standard first articulated in Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938), Miranda holds that "[t]he 
defendant may waive effectuation" of the rights conveyed in 
the warnings "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently." 384 U. S., at 444, 475. The 
inquiry has two distinct dimensions. Edwards v. Arizona, 
supra, at 482; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 404 (1977). 
First the relinquishment of the right must have been volun-
tary in the sense that it was the product of a free and delib-
erate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. 
Second, the waiver must have been made with a full aware-
ness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the 
consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the "to-
tality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" re-
veal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of com-
prehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda 
rights have been waived. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 
707, 725 (1979). See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 
u. s. 369, 374-375 (1979). 
Under this standard, we have no doubt that respondent 
validly waived his right to remain silent and to the presence 
of counsel. The voluntariness of the waiver is not at issue. 
As the Court of Appeals correctly acknowledged, the record 
is devoid of any suggestion that police resorted to physical or 
psychological pressure to elicit the statements. 753 F. 2d, at 
184. Indeed it appears that it was respondent, and not the 
police, who spontaneously initiated the conversation that led 
to the first and most damaging confession. Id., at 180. 
Cf. Edwards v. Arizona, supra. Nor is there any question 
about respondent's comprehension of the full panoply of 
rights set out in the Miranda warnings and of the potential 
consequences of a decision to relinquish them. Nonetheless, 
the Court of Appeals believed that the "[d]eliberate or reck-
less" conduct of the police, in particular their failure to inform 
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lidity of the otherwise proper waiver. We find this conclu-
sion untenable as a matter of both logic and precedent. 
Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect 
and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on 
the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a con-
stitutional right. Under the analysis of the Court of Ap-
peals, the same defendant, armed with the same information 
and confronted with precisely the same police conduct, would 
have knowingly waived his Miranda rights had a lawyer not 
telephoned the police station to inquire about his status. 
Nothing in any of our waiver decisions or in our understand-
ing of the essential components of a valid waiver requires so 
incongruous a result. No doubt the additional information 
would have been useful to respondent; perhaps even it might 
have affected his decision to confess. But we have never 
read the Constitution to require that the police supply a sus-
pect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self 
interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights. 
See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. --, -- (1985); 
United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 188 (1977). Cf. 
Hill v. Lockhart, ante, at --; M cM ann v. Richardson, 397 
U. S. 759, 769 (1970). Once it is determined that a suspect's 
decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all 
times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and 
that he was aware of the state's intention to use his state-
ments to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the 
waiver is valid as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals' 
conclusion to the contrary was in error. 
Nor do we believe that the level of the police's culpability 
in failing to inform respondent of the telephone call has _any 
bearing on the validity of the waiver. In light of the state-
court findings that there was no "conspiracy or collusion" on 
the part of the police, 451 A. 2d, at 30, n. 5, we have serious 
doubts about whether the Court of Appeals was free to con-
clude that their conduct constituted "deliberate or reckless ir-
responsibility." 753 F. 2d, at 185; see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). 
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But whether intentional or inadvertent, the state of mind of 
the police is irrelevant to the question of the intelligence and 
voluntariness of respondent's election to abandon his rights. 
Although highly inappropriate, even deliberate deception of 
an attorney could not possibly affect a suspect's decision to 
waive his Miranda rights unless he were at least aware of the 
incident. Compare Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 481 
(1964) (excluding confession where police incorrectly told the 
suspect that his lawyer "'didn't want to see' him"). Nor was 
the failure to inform respondent of the telephone call the kind 
of "trick[ery ]" that can vitiate the validity of a waiver. 
Miranda, 384 U. S., at 476. Granting that the "deliberate 
or reckless" withholding of information is objectionable as a 
matter or ethics, such conduct is only relevant to the con-
stitutional validity of a waiver if it deprives a defendant of 
knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of 
his rights and the consequences of abandoning them. Be-
cause respondent's voluntary decision to speak was made 
with full awareness and comprehension of all the information 
Miranda requires the police to convey, the waivers were 
valid. 
B 
At oral argument respondent acknowledged that a con-
stitutional rule requiring the police to inform a suspect of an 
attorney's efforts to reach him would represent a significant 
extension of our precedents. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32-33. He 
contends, however, that the conduct of the Providence police 
was so inimical to the Fifth Amendment values Miranda 
seeks to protect that we should read that decision to condemn 
their behavior. Regardless of any issue of waiver, he urges, 
the Fifth Amendment requires the reversal of a conviction if 
the police are less than forthright in their dealings with an 
attorney or if they fail to tell a suspect of a lawyer's unilateral 
efforts to contact him. Because the proposed modification 
ignores the underlying purposes of the Miranda rules and be-




MORAN v. BURBINE 
-
balance between society's legitimate law enforcement inter-
ests and the protection of the defendant's Fifth Amendment 
rights, we decline the invitation to further extend Miranda's 
reach. 
At the outset, while we share respondent's distaste for the 
deliberate misleading of an officer of the court, reading 
Miranda to forbid police deception of an attorney "would cut 
[the decision] completely loose from its own explicitly stated 
rationale." Beckwith v. United States, 425 U. S. 341, 345 
(1976). As is now well established, "[t]he .. . Miranda 
warnings are 'not themselves rights protected by the Con-
stitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the [sus-
pect' s] right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] pro-
tected. " ' New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 654 (1984), 
quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 444 (1974). 
Their objective is not to mold police conduct for its own sake. 
Nothing in the Constitution vests in us the authority to man-
date a code of behavior for state officials wholly unconnected 
to any federal right or privilege. The purpose of the 
Miranda warnings instead is to dissipate the compulsion 
inherent in custodial interrogation and, in so doing, guard 
against abridgement of the suspect's Fifth Amendment 
rights. Clearly, a rule that focuses on how the police treat 
an attorney-conduct that has no relevance at all to the de-
gree of compulsion experienced by the defendant during in-
terrogation-would ignore both Miranda's mission and its 
only source of legitimacy. 
Nor are we prepared to adopt a rule requiring that the 
police inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts to reach him. 
While such a rule might add marginally to Miranda's goal of 
dispelling the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, 
overriding practical considerations counsel against its adop-
tion. As we have stressed on numerous occasions, "[o]ne of 
the principal advantages" of Miranda is the ease and clarity 
of its application. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. --, 
-- (1984); see also New York v. Quarles, supra, at --
-
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(concurring opinion); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S., at 718. 
We have lit tle doubt that the approach urged by respondent 
and endorsed by the Court of Appeals would have the inev-
itable consequence of muddying Miranda's otherwise rela-
tively clear waters. The legal questions it would spawn are 
legion: To what extent should the police be held accountable 
for knowing that the accused has counsel? Is it enough that 
someone in the station house knows, or must the interrogat-
ing officer himself know of counsel's efforts to contact the 
suspect? Do counsel's efforts to talk to the suspect concern-
ing one criminal investigation trigger the obligation to inform 
the defendant before interrogation may proceed on a wholly 
separate matter? We are unwilling to modify Miranda in 
manner that would so clearly undermine the decision's cen-
tral "virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specific-
ity ... what they may do in conducting [a] custodial interro-
gation, and of informing courts under what circumstances 
statements obtained during such interrogation are not admis-
sible." Fare v. Michael C. , supra, at 718. 
Moreover, problems of clarity to one side, reading 
Miranda to require the police in each instance to inform a 
suspect of an attorney's effort's to reach him would work a 
substantial and, we think, inappropriate shift in the subtle 
balance struck in that decision. Custodial interrogations im-
plicate two competing concerns. On the one hand, "the need 
for police questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of 
criminal laws" cannot be doubted. Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U. S. 218, 225 (1973). Admissions of guilt are 
more than merely "desirable," United States v. Washington, 
431 U. S., at 186; they are essential to society's compelling 
interest in finding, convicting and punishing those who vio-
late the law. On the other hand, the Court has recognized 
that the interrogation process is "inherently coercive" and 
that, as a consequence, there exists a substantial risk that 
the police will inadvertently traverse the fine line between 
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permissible compulsion. New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S., at 
--. Miranda attempted to reconcile these opposing con-
cerns by giving the defendant the power to exert some con-
trol over the course of the interrogation. Declining to adopt 
the more extreme position that the actual presence of a law-
yer was necessary to dispel the coercion inherent in custodial 
interrogation, see Brief for American Civil Liberties Union 
as Amicus Curiae in Miranda v. Arizona, 0. T. 1965, 
No. 759, pp. 22-31, the Court found that the suspect's Fifth 
Amendment rights could be adequately protected by less in-
trusive means. Police questioning, often an essential part of 
the investigatory process, could continue in its traditional 
form, the Court held, but only if the suspect clearly under-
stood that, at any time, he could bring the proceeding to a 
halt or, short of that, call in an attorney to give advice and 
monitor the conduct of his interrogators. 
The position urged by respondent would upset this care-
fully drawn approach in a manner that is both unnecessary 
for the protection of the Fifth Amendent privilege and injuri-
ous to legitimate law enforcement. Because, as Miranda 
\ holds, full comprehension of the rights to remain silent and 
request an attorney are sufficient to dispel whatever coercion 
is inherent in the interrogation process, a rule requiring the 
police to inform the suspect of an attorney's efforts to contact 
him would contribute to the protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege only incidentally, if at all. This minimal ben-
efit, however, would come at a substantial cost to society's 
legitimate and substantial interest in securing admissions of 
guilt. Indeed, the very premise of the Court of Appeals was 
not that awareness of Ms. Munson's phone call would have 
dissipated the coercion of the interrogation room, but that it 
might have convinced respondent not to speak at all. 753 F. 
2d, at 185. Because neither the letter nor purposes of 
Miranda require this additional handicap on otherwise per-
missible investigatory efforts, we are unwilling to expand the 
-
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Miranda rules to require the police to keep the suspect 
abreast of the status of his legal representation. 
III 
Respondent also contends that the Sixth Amendment re-
quires exclusion of his three confessions.' It is clear, of 
course, that, absent a valid waiver, the defendant has the 
right to the presence of an attorney during any interrogation 
occurring after the first formal charging proceeding, the 
point at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel initially 
attaches. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U. S. 180, - -
(1984); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682, 689 (1972) (opinion of 
Stewart, J.) See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S., at 400-401. 
And we readily agree that once the right has attached, it fol-
lows that the police may not interfere with the efforts of a 
defendant's attorney to act as a "'medium' between [the sus-
pect] and the State" during the interrogation. Maine v. 
Moulton, ante, at --; see Brewer v. Williams, supra, at 
401, n. 8. The difficulty for respondent is that the interroga-
. tion sessions that yielded the inculpatory statements took 
place before the initiation of "adversary judicial proceedings." 
United States v. Gouveia, supra, at 192. He contends, how-
ever, that this circumstance is not fatal to his Sixth Amend-
ment claim. At least in some situations, he argues, the 
Sixth Amendment protects the integrity of the attorney-cli-
ent relationship 2 regardless of whether the prosecution has 
1 Petitioner does not argue that respondent's valid waiver of his Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel necessarily served to waive his parallel rights 
under the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, we have no occasion to con-
sider whether a waiver for one purpose necessarily operates as a general 
waiver of the right to counsel for all purposes. 
2 Notwithstanding the Rhode Island Supreme Court's finding that, as a 
matter of state law, no attorney-client relationship existed between re-
spondent and Ms. Munson, the Sixth Amendment issue is properly before 
us. State v. Burbine, 451 A. 2d 22, 29 (1982). Petitioner now concedes 
that such a relationship existed and invites us to decide the Sixth Amend-
ment question based on that concession. Of course, a litigant's concession 
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in fact commenced "by way of formal charge, preliminary 
hearing, indictment, information or arraignment." 467 
U. S., at 188. Placing principal reliance on a footnote in 
Miranda, 384 U. S., at 465, n. 35, and on Escobedo v. Illi-
nois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964), he maintains that Gouveia, Kirby 
and our other "critical stage" cases, concern only the narrow 
question of when the right to counsel-that is, to the appoint-
ment or presence of counsel-attaches. The right to non-in-
terference with an attorney's dealings with a criminal sus-
pect, he asserts, arises the moment that the relationship is 
formed, or, at the very least, once the defendant is placed in 
custodial interrogation. 
We are not persuaded. At the outset, subsequent deci-
sions foreclose any reliance on Escobedo and Miranda for the 
proposition that the Sixth Amendment right, in any of its 
manifestations, applies prior to the initiation of adversary 
judicial proceedings. Although Escobedo was originally de-
cided as a Sixth Amendment case, "the Court in retrospect 
perceived that the 'prime purpose' of Escobedo was not to 
vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such, but, like 
Miranda, 'to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege 
against self-incrimination .... "' Kirby v. Illinois, supra, 
at 689, quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 729 
(1966). Clearly then, Escobedo provides no support for re-
spondent's argument. Nor, of course, does Miranda, the 
holding of which rested exclusively on the Fifth Amendment. 
Thus, the decision's brief observation about the reach of 
Escobedo's Sixth Amendment analysis is not only dictum, but 
reflects an understanding of the case that the Court has 
state court's interpretation of state law. Respondent's argument, how-
ever, does not focus on whether an attorney-client relationship actually ex-
isted as a formal matter of state law. He argues instead that, on the par-
ticular facts of this case, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been 
violated. In any event, even if the existence of an attorney-client relation-
ship could somehow independently trigger the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, a position we reject, the type of circumstances that would give rise 
to the right would certainly have a federal definition. 
-
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expressly disavowed. See also, United States v. Gouveia, 
supra, at 188, n. 5; Y. Kamisar, Police Interrogation and 
Confessions 217-218, n. 94 (1980). 
Questions of precedent to one side, we find respondent's 
understanding of the Sixth Amendment both practically and 
theoretically unsound. As a practical matter, it makes little 
sense to say that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attaches at different times depending on the fortuity of 
whether the suspect or his family happens to have retained 
counsel prior to interrogation. Cf. id., at 220-221. More 
importantly, the suggestion that the existence of an attorney-
client relationship itself triggers the protections of the Sixth 
Amendment misconceives the underlying purposes of the 
right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment's intended function 
is not to wrap a protective cloak around the attorney-client 
relationship for its own sake any more than it is to protect a 
suspect from the consequences of his own candor. Its pur-
pose, rather, is to assure that in any "criminal prosecutio[n]," 
U. S. Const., Arndt. 6, the accused shall not be left to his 
own devices in facing the "'prosecutorial forces of organized 
society."' Maine v. Moulton; ante, at -- (quoting Kirby 
v. Illinois, 406 U. S., at 689). By its very terms, it becomes 
applicable only when the government's role shifts from inves-
tigation to accusation. For it is only then that the assistance 
of one versed in the "intricacies ... of law," ibid., is needed 
to assure that the prosecution's case encounters "the crucible 
of meaningful adversarial testing." United States v. Cronic, 
466 u. s. 648, 656 (1984). 
Indeed, in Maine v. Moulton, decided this Term, the 
Court again confirmed that looking to the initiation of adver-
sary judicial proceedings, far from being mere formalism, is 
fundamental to the proper application of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. There, we considered the constitu-
tional implications of a surreptitious investigation that 
yielded evidence pertaining to two crimes. For one, the de-
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cerning the former, the Court reaffirmed that after the first 
charging proceeding the government may not deliberately 
elicit incriminating statements from an accused out of the 
presence of counsel. See also Massiah v. United States, 377 
U. S. 201 (1964). The Court made clear, however, that the 
evidence concerning the crime for which the defendant had 
not been indicted-evidence obtained in precisely the same 
manner from the identical suspect-would be admissible at a 
trial limited to those charges. Maine v. Moulton, ante, at 
-- and--, n. 16. The clear implication of the holding, 
and one that confirms the teaching of Gouveia, is that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until after 
the initiation of formal charges. Moreover, because Moulton 
already had legal representation, the decision all but fore-
closes respondent's argument that the attorney-client rela-
tionship itself triggers the Sixth Amendment right. 
Respondent contends, however, that custodial interroga-
tions require a different rule. Because confessions elicited 
during the course of police questioning often seal a suspect's 
fate, he argues, the need for an advocate-and the concomi-
tant right to non-interference with the attorney-client rela-
tionship-is at its zenith, regardless of whether the state has 
initiated the first adversary judicial proceeding. We do not 
doubt that a lawyer's presence could be of value to the sus-
pect; and we readily agree that if a suspect confesses, his 
attorney's case at trial will be that much more difficult. But 
these concerns are no more decisive in this context than they 
were for the the equally damaging pre-indictment lineup at 
issue in Kirby, or the statements pertaining to the unindicted 
crime elicted from the defendant in Maine v. Moulton. 
Compare United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 226-227 
(1967) (Sixth Amendment attaches at post-indictment 
lineup); Massiah v. United States, supra, (after indictment, 
police may not elicit statements from suspect out of the pres-
ence of counsel). For an interrogation, no more or less than 
for any other "critical" pre-trial event, the possibility that the 
-
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encounter may have important consequences at trial, stand-
ing alone, is insufficient to trigger the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel. As Gouveia made clear, until such time as 
the "'government has committed itself to prosecute, and . . . 
the adverse positions of government and defendant have 
solidified'" the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not 
attach. United States v. Gouveia, supra, at 189 (quoting 
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S., at 689.). 
Because, as respondent acknowledges, the events that led 
to the inculpatory statements preceded the formal initiation 
of adversary judicial proceedings, we reject the contention 
that the conduct of the police violated his rights under the 
Sixth Amendment. 
IV 
Finally, respondent contends that the conduct of the police 
was so offensive as to deprive him of the fundamental fair-
ness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Focusing primarily on the impropriety 
of conveying false information to an attorney, he invites us to 
declare that such behavior should be condemned as violative 
of canons fundamental to the " 'traditions and conscience of 
our people."' Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 169 
(1952), quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 
(1934). We do not foreclose the possibility that on facts 
more egregious then those presented here police deception 
might rise to the level of a due process violation. On this 
record, however, we conclude that the challenged conduct 
falls short of the kind of behavior that so shocks the sensibil-
ities of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into 
the criminal processes of the states. 
We hold therefore that the Court of Appeals erred in find-
ing that the Federal Constitution required the exclusion of 
the three inculpatory statements. Accordingly, we reverse 
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